Discuss Ch1Part2 here

'to the world of “cybernetics,” the study of control at a distance.'

-- This is wrong. The word "cybernetics" was created by Norbert Wiener and is directly derived from the Greek word "kybernetes" (there is a variety of spellings) which means the man who stands at the tiller and steers the boat, a steersman. Thus there is definitely the meaning of control, but no distance is involved. Wiener used the word 'cybernetics' to name a field of study of, as we would say today, mechanisms with feedback loops or self-regulating devices. So there is a nuance of self-regulation thrown in. Look here -- http://[[http://www.gwu.edu/~asc/cyber_definition.html][www.gwu.edu/~asc/cyber_definition.html]] -- for more information. [Kaa]

to continue,

'Cybernetics had a vision of perfect regulation. Its very motivation was finding a better way to direct.'

-- Again, this is incorrect. Cybernetics deals with self-regulation and with self-regulating devices, thus this example rather goes against the argument the author is making (unless, of course, we jump one level deeper and descend into an Orwellian world where everyone is forced/convinced to self-regulate themselves...) [Kaa]

-- Andres F Umana's Comment: I want to continue a little more with Bill's comments in the Rewriting Code class about the meaning of the expression "Code is law". The "problem" with the expression "Code is law" is that it plays with two different meanings of the word "law", one external and one internal. If you try to determine, just from an external point of view (as an observer) what things constrain the behavior of individuals, then you get the four modalities: law, market, norms and arquitecture. If you call these modalities of regulation "law", then code is law. But the "problem" is that we usually use the word law in a very different sense. We usually include an internal aspect in the word, which involves the conviction of the individuals that the conduct is legitimately mandatory (this follows HLA Hart's theory). The reason why we think a certain behavior is mandatory is that we recognize the rule as a legitimate way to control our behavior. That's why we call it "law". In other words, there's a political legitimacy that every use of the word "law" has.

--And this is where arquitecture seems at first glance to be different from state law and norms. One could say that Arquitecture always lacks this internal aspect; we never think that the arquitecture is by itself a reason to follow a certain behavior. Going back to the house example we discussed in class, I think that we intuitively believe that that a house is my property and I can do whatever I want with it. In principle, I can tear down the walls without nobody being able to say anything. Now, there are urban regulations that do not allow me to do everything I want with my house. But then the reason why I refrain from tearing down a wall is not the arquitecture, but state or contract law. So my point is that, from the perspective of the individual, arquitecture is usually not considered a "rule", is never a reason (in the political sense) to refrain from a certain conduct. From the internal perspective the arquitecture is only a fact, a way the world is, which I can legitimately change. In this sense, Code would NEVER be law. This seems to generate a real and difficult problem, which is addressed in chapter seven. We can restate chapter seven's argument in chapter one's terminology: We need to recognize that the arquitecture is in practice restraining our behavior (law from the external point of view), but without the political process that we use for everything that we call "law" ( in the internal point of view). That's why there's no transparency (In this sense, chapter seven is the key to understand the meaning of the expression "code is law" in chapter one, so a reference might be useful).

--But this difference of Arquitecture may be superficial. I think one could argue that Arquitecture is law in every sense, and the key to it is INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY. Can I really change the arquitecture of cyberspace? Yes, but only if you own the IP that controls the arquitecture. Unless you're the IP owner, any change of arquitecture is a violation of IP. So there's an internal legal element embedded in the arquitecture. Code is law, not only as a fact, but also from a traditional view, because there's a whole legal regime that says that you can't change the arquitecture of cyberspace unless you create it in the first place. Code is a factual and a moral constraint.

Andres F Umana SLS

[AXQ] I don't agree with Andres' characterization of architecture as lacking internal legitimacy. Surely it is possible to question the legitimacy of code as easily as one can question the legitimacy of government regulation, but as some examples in the book and discussed in the Code class point out, at a very basic level most people see elements of the architecture, the underlying playing-field, as being so legitimate that they are in fact taken for granted. You might believe you can do anything you want with your house, but you're not about to knock down a load-bearing wall because you don't like the way it looks. Gravity and structural rules form an underlying framework that are hardly even questioned, much less rebelled against. In how many new technological areas does the concept of the "ick factor" play a serious role in the discussion -- this feeling that what a new technology wants to do is "just wrong" or "against nature"? What is this other than a deeply engrained feeling that the these ex ante laws laid down by the world at large have a core legitimacy? Part of the reason why programmers originally resisted Lessig's message is because they wanted to regulation that code performs to be intrinsic, axiomatic, and beyond our attempts to streamline or metagame. This idea that regulation from architecture flows naturally from other properties of architecture and is the wrong subject for alteration to produce behavior is a strong one, even if it is proven to be wrong.

The issue Andres brings up about the legitimacy of different forms of regulation is a meaningful one. Why do we accept each kind of regulation as legitimate? I resist the idea that architecture lacks any core element of credibility, but am open to the idea that perhaps it derives that element from a different source than government law. There may be room later in the book to address these questions more thoroughly. [/AXQ]